Lambie was born in 1868 in
Glasgow,
Scotland. He was in the
British Army with the Highland Light Infantry during the late 1890s. He left Britain for active service in
South Africa before later returning to England. In July 1921, aged 53, his body was found on a railway line near
Smethwick. Claude is seated here in the second row,3rd from the right beside the Lancashire Cup.
Claude Lambie (1868–1921)
was a
Scottish professional
footballer who played as a centre forward. He had two spells in
the Football League with
Burnley in the late 19th century, as well as playing in the
Scottish Football League with
Clyde. He is notable for being the first ever Burnley player to score a
hat-trick in a competitive match at
Turf Moor, and actually scored the club's first four competitive hat-tricks at the ground. After retiring from football, he became a
private in the
British Army.
Playing career
Lambie began his footballing career in his native Glasgow in the latter part of the 1880s when he joined
Glasgow Thistle, who at the time played in the
Scottish Football Alliance. His performances and goalscoring for Thistle attracted clubs in the English
Football League. In 1889, he was signed by
Burnley.
In his first season with
the Clarets, Lambie played only seven times in the league, but scored five goals in this time. In the
1890–91 season
he played 18 matches and scored 16 goals as the side finished eighth in
the league. During this first spell at Burnley, he became the
first-ever Burnley player to score a
hat-trick in a competitive match at
Turf Moor, in the 7–0 victory over
Bolton Wanderers on 1 March 1890. He went on to score three more hat-tricks in the following season; one against
Aston Villa in a 4–4 draw, and two hat-tricks against
Derby County. In total he made 27 senior appearances for
the Clarets, scoring on 22 occasions before he left the club in the summer of 1891.
Upon leaving Burnley, Lambie moved back north to Scotland to join
Scottish Football League outfit
Clyde. He helped Clyde achieve an eighth placed finish in the
1891–1892 campaign before briefly leaving football to join the
Highland Light Infantry.
He returned to
Football League First Division
Burnley in the 1892–93 season, but he only made four appearances in the
league and did not manage to score. He left Burnley the same season and
subsequently retired from football to rejoin the Army.
The battle of Modder River
The battle of Modder River began early on 28 November 1899. The
British entered the battle with little knowledge
of the exact whereabouts of the enemy. Nor did they march forward with
a detailed battle plan. Methuen had
decided not to commit to any plan until he could discover the location
of the enemy. To do this, the 9th Lancers
were sent forward at 04.00. At about 05.30, they located the Boer
position on the right. They were prevented
from reconnoitring further by Boer fire. Maj Little reported back to
Methuen that the Boers held a strong
position between the bridge and a group of poplars to the east. The
farms on the southern bank of the river were
well fortified, as were the nearby villages of Modder and Rosmead.
What the mounted troops could not see was
that west of the bridge, as well as further east of the poplars, the
river-banks were also well fortified.
Methuen's maps and intelligence had indicated that the Modder and
Riet rivers could be forded at any point.(84)
The intelligence, inscribed in British maps, was totally erroneous.
The rivers were not fordable. After the
bridge had been dynamited by the Boers, the only places where the
British could cross were four miles (6,4 km) to
the east at Bosman's Drift and six miles (9,6 km) to the west at
Rosmead's Drift. The British had no knowledge
of either of these places.(85) Methuen did not have enough mounted
troops to carry out a sufficient reconnaissance of
the area. To make matters worse, the course of the Riet River had also
been improperly drawn. In fact, just
about every detail on Capt W A O'Meara's roughly drawn map was
inaccurate. Baring Pemberton was
correct: As a result, the British would pay a huge cost for their
victory that day.(86)
Methuen had hurriedly ordered the Guards and 9th brigades out of
camp early in the morning at 04.30.
Many did not have a chance to take their coffee and eat their
breakfast. This had a most unfortunate consequence,
since the battle would last most of the day. After marching in close
order for two hours, at 06.30 they
were ordered to extend. By 07.00, most had entered the battle. The 9th
Brigade advanced on the left, to the west
of the railway, with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in reserve.
They advanced towards Rosmead,
which, unbeknown to them, had been fortified by Prinsloo and the Free
Staters. To the right of the railroad, the
Guards Brigade advanced towards the junction of the two rivers, where
De la Rey's commando awaited them.
There, Methuen believed, the Guards could extend and hit the Boer left
flank. Both British flanks were protected
by mounted troops. The two field artillery batteries, the 75th and
18th, as well as the naval guns, stayed in the
centre along the railway. The 62nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery,
arrived later in the battle from the Orange
River Station and was deployed on the far left.
The deployment of the Guards was directed by Gen Colvile. They
were formed into two lines. On the front
line, the Scots Guards advanced on the right, the Grenadiers in the
middle, and the 2nd Bn Coldstream
Guards on the left. The second line, consisting of the 1st Bn
Coldstream Guards, stayed behind in reserve.
Although the Guards had not yet located the enemy, they cautiously
advanced towards the river in extended order.
About 1 200 yards (1 097m) from the river, the Boers opened fire.
A hail of bullets came over the force. Had
the Boers waited for the British to come in closer, the casualties, no
doubt, would have been far greater than
they were.
Lord Methuen and his Chief of Staff and close friend, Lt Col H P
Northcott, who were inspecting the ground,
trying to locate the Boers, were caught in the deluge. They both
escaped from the encounter unscathed. Later
in the battle, Northcott, while riding Methuen's horse, was mortally
wounded in attempting to deliver a message
to Colvile.
The Guards Brigade attempted to advance directly into the Boer
fire zone. Colvile ordered the Coldstream
Guards to move further to the right and envelope the Boers' left
flank. Lt Col Alfred Codrington, comman-
ding the 1st Bn Coldstream Guards, soon realised the Boer flank was
protected by the Riet River. The British
maps had inaccurately shown its course. Detachments were sent down the
river to scout for fords, but none
could be located. The Coldstream Guards could not get at the Boers.
The Guards were left without options: they
had to make a frontal attack. The heavy Boer fire prevented the force,
with the exception of an odd heroic
but costly rush, from getting any closer than 1 000 yards (914m). From
roughly 07.00 until nightfall, when the
battle ended, the Guards remained where they were. Their only cover
was provided by friendly artillery fire;
accordingly, their casualties increased and their ammunition decreased.
Commanded by Maj Gen Pole-Carew, the 9th Brigade was likewise in
action all day. Pole-Carew was ordered
by Methuen to advance towards the railway bridge. Pole-Carew soon
realised, however, that due to the extended
order of the Guards, he could not risk sending the Northumberland
Fusiliers to hit the railroad bridge from
the east, or they would overlap the Guards. This would cause confusion
and risk the chance of being caught in
close order. The rest of the force, the KOYLI in the centre and the
Loyal North Lancashires on the left, were
then forced west to make room for the Northumberland Fusiliers. At
about 07.30, as the Northumberland
Fusiliers were crossing the railroad tracks, the Boers opened fire.
With the Northumberland Fusiliers pinned
down on the right, the other two battalions advanced on Rosmead
Village. The poor intelligence reports again
resulted in heavy losses as Pole-Carew attempted to ford the river.
The British were able to locate and occupy a
donga, a small ravine with steep sides, extending into the river
towards the Boer trench.
Methuen, like Wellington at Waterloo, was seen everywhere that day
on the battlefield. He believed that he
could do more good on the battlefield raising the morale of the men,
than he could from a safe, distant point
directing the overall battle with field glasses. As Conan Doyle wrote:
'... his own personal gallantry and
unflinching resolution set the most stimulating example to his troops.
No general could have done more to put heart
into his men.'(87) On the left of the railway, Methuen personally led
one of the rushes to reinforce the captured
donga. This position proved significant. Under Methuen's guidance, a
small party of Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, safe in the donga, along with the artillery, provided
covering fire for a detachment of the KOYLI
which successfully seized the Boer trench on the south bank of the
river. This gave the British their first
foothold on the Modder. Methuen then returned to the other end of the
battlefield to assist Colvile.
From the position captured on the south bank, the British were now
able to advance across the river. Pole-
Carew led a successful rush across the 300 yard (274m) wide river,
where the men at times had to wade up to
their armpits, and seized Rosmead Village.(88) As De la Rey feared,
Prinsloo and the Free Staters fled. More
soldiers of the 9th Brigade were eventually able to cross the river
and reach the safety of the northern trench.
However, due to heavy Boer artillery fire, they could not get to
Pole-Carew to reinforce him. Pole-Carew made
one gallant rush to reach the Boer guns, but was forced to retreat and
entrench in Rosmead. Although the British
artillery fired well all day, they could not knock out the well
entrenched Boer guns.
By late afternoon, the British troops were tiring. The heat, the
weariness from the long day of battle, the
fatigue of fighting three battles in less than a week, and the lack of
water had sapped the British troops of their
energy. To make things worse, just before 16.30, Methuen was wounded
by a bullet. The shrapnel entered
his thigh and he was forced to leave the battlefield. Much of the
British morale went with him. Command of
the division devolved to Colvile. Arthur Paget took command of the
Guards.(89)
Colvile, at first, wanted to continue the battle. Although his own
Guards Brigade had not been able to
advance, Pole-Carew's capture of Rosmead gave the British a strong
position on the north bank of the river.
But, with Methuen injured and the men too tired to attempt another
river crossing, he postponed the attack.
He decided that he would continue the attack the next day at dawn.
Methuen agreed with his decision.(90) Colvile's
preparations were for naught for at 20.00 that night, Cronje decided
that, because of the departure of Prinsloo
and his men, he could not hold his position and retreated towards
Jacobsdal. The next morning, the British crossed
the Modder River without interference and made camp.(91) There they
stayed for the next week. Kimberley would
not be relieved according to Methuen's timetable.
The Modder River battle was another victory for Methuen and the
British, but it was also, relative to the
other colonial wars of this era, another extremely costly one. More
than sixty British were killed and another 300
were wounded - a casualty rate of 7%.(92) The faulty maps and
insufficient reconnaissance were responsible for much
of this loss, but they certainly do not explain everything that
happened that day. Methuen's most vital error was
in his underestimation of the situation. He refused to accept the
information that the Beers were entrenched at
the Modder River in force, believing instead that the force at the
Modder River was simply a small skirmishing
party.
Another criticism made against Methuen was his lack of overall
direction of the battle. It has been suggested that
there was no plan of attack. Because the location of the enemy was not
entirely known, only a general plan was
formulated before the advance. Methuen did not send out more
reconnaissance parties to obtain this information,
because he did not want to delay the British advance. Regardless, the
troops were laid out in battle order with
specific assignments based on the limited information available.
The criticism made by Amery and others that, once the battle
began, Methuen failed to take control and issue
specific orders is not entirely accurate. Methuen can, in part, be
blamed for some of the miscommunication or
lack of communication. It is true that his personal conduct was
admirable by leading rushes and directing
movements on the battlefield, but, in taking part in these small
actions, he seldom could be reached at headquarters
during the day, and therefore few orders were issued. However, in his
defence, orders that were issued were
also not always successfully delivered. As Methuen emphasized in his
report, it was very difficult to relay
information across the battlefield. 'It seems like "Dante's Inferno"
out of which men hope someday to emerge.'(93)
Unprepared for facing an enemy equipped with modern weapons capable of
producing enormous firepower, the
War Office had not supplied Methuen's division with runners. This made
intercommunication virtually
impossible, since the bulk of both brigades was constantly under fire.
Methuen, therefore, had to rely on his aides
for transmitting information, but he hesitated in sending them into
dangerous situations. Northcott was killed in
one such attempt and Methuen took the news of his death personally,
blaming himself.(94) As a result of poor
communication, Colvile did not become aware that he had assumed
command of the division for at least thirty
minutes after Methuen's injury. It was not until after dusk that
Pole-Carew heard that Colvile had decided to
stop the battle.
As Pemberton has pointed out, the lack of a signal corps also
hindered communication.(95) Those detachments
of the 9th Brigade which successfully crossed the river were often
endangered by friendly artillery fire. Pole-
Carew had to retreat more than once to escape that hazard. Without a
signal corps, he could not transmit the
position of the Boer artillery to his own artillery. As a result, the
British could not penetrate any further. These
failures cannot be blamed on Methuen's personal leadership but only on
the inefficiency of the War Office to
adequately prepare to meet the challenges put forth by new technology.
At the battle of Modder River, Methuen conducted a frontal assault
against an enemy fortified in an unknown
position. His decision to do so can justly be criticized. Was this
decision connected to Methuen's training and
experiences of the previous thirty years? The answer is a decisive
yes. Battles waged at Amaoful, Tel-el-Kebir,
Dargai and elsewhere reinforced the belief that the British soldier
was capable of turning the enemy regardless of his
position. It is true that Methuen learned valuable lessons at Belmont
and Graspan. He learned the difficulties of
trying to conduct a flank attack against the much more mobile Boer. He
learned that a frontal assault without an
accomplished flank attack could be dangerous. He learned that the
frontal assault was the only available
tactic to ensure contact with the enemy. But his belief in the
invincibility of the British footsoldier remained
unshaken and, in light of this, to carry out his orders, he felt that
his men could bring victory through a frontal
attack no matter what the odds.
Had Methuen known the exact number of the Boer forces, he still
would have had to assault their position,
or leave them on his flank. He believed that the force at the Modder
River was only a small party attempting to
delay the British. He expected the main Boer force to be busily
entrenching further north at Spytfontein. There-
fore, Methuen had greater reason to believe that the surest and
fastest way to drive the Boers from the
Modder River was with a frontal attack.
